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Legal Liability in
Tobacco Products Cases
By EUGENE E. SExR, JR.*
Introduction
This paper deals with the role of tobacco and smoking in the
causation of lung cancer and other diseases and whether a cause
of action exists for injuries sustained as a result of using tobacco
products. The burden of establishing a causal connection be-
tween cancer or other illnesses and the defendant's wrongful
act has always presented a difficult obstacle to the injured
plaintiff. But today with the advent of the Surgeon General's
Report,' it appears that there will be few problems in establishing
this causal connection to the extent of sending the question to the
civil jury. But causation is only the first step in awarding dam-
ages to a plaintiff in such a law suit. He must also clear the
additional hurdles of selecting a theory to rely upon, whether
it be negligence, implied warranty, express warranty, misrepre-
sentation, or some other theory; the problem of lack of privity
between the consumer and the manufacturer; and whether the
consumer assumes the risk by using tobacco known to be harmful
or in some way is contributorily negligent. This topic affects
many people today. It was reported that in 1955, 68 per cent of
the male population and 32.4 per cent of the female population
18 years of age and over were regular smokers of cigarettes.2
This means that nearly 70 million people in the United States
now consume tobacco regularly,3 and most of this is in cigarettes.
In 1910 cigarette consumption per person 15 years or older was
* Attorney, Williamsburg, Kentucky. Member, Kentucky, Virginia, and Dis-
trict of Columbia Bars. B.A., Vanderbilt University, 1958; LL.B., University of
Virginia, 1968; LL.M., Georgetown University, 1964.
1 Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service,
Report on Smoking and Health (1964) [hereinafter cited as Surgeon Generals
Report].
2 Current Population Survey (1955).
3 Surgeon General's Report 26.
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188 per year, this rose to 1,865 in 1930; 1,828 in 1940; to 3,322 in
1950; and to 3,986 in 1961. At the same time, per capita con-
sumption of tobacco in other ways has gone down. Thus, per
capita consumption of cigars declined from 117 in 1920 to 55 in
1962; pipe tobacco consumption fell from 22 pounds per person
in 1910 to one-half pound in 1962; and use of chewing tobacco
has declined from four pounds per person in 1900 to half a pound
in 1962.' These statistics on overall tobacco usage for the last 50
years means that if a close link in causation between tobacco and
illnesses is found and recovery is available under the remedies
in the courts of law, then a great area of prospective recovery
may soon be opening up.
Causation
The causal link between tobacco consumption and cancer or
other illnesses has been suspected for a few years, but no report
on this matter affected the general public to the extent that the
SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT did when it was released to the
American people in January of 1964. The sale of tobacco in
forms other than cigarettes increased 5 while cigarette sales de-
creased, at least for a short duration; cigarette manufacturers'
stocks went plummeting on the New York Stock Exchange; and
the cigarette industry announced the appointment of an adminis-
trator to act as a czar to enforce a cigarette advertising code with
tight restrictions.6 This, however, was not the first indication of
the causal connection between cancer and other illnesses and
smoking cigarettes. Therefore the history of other findings and
reports will be explored before the SURGEON GENERAiLs REPORT
is analyzed.
During the past fifty years total death rates have declined
rapidly.7 But lung cancer is a very striking exception. After
adjusting for differences in age distribution, that is, a comparison
is made only between persons of the same age for different
periods (e.g., the rates of those between the ages of 50-60 in 1900
4 Ibid.
GThis probably was due to the conclusion that while cigarette smokers had a
mortality rate about 70 per cent higher that that for non-smokers, cigar smokers,
at least those who smoked less than five per day, and pipe smokers had about the
same death rates as the non-smoker. See Surgeon General's Report 108-112.
G Washington Post, April 28, 1964, p. 1, col. S.
7 Hammond, The Effects of Smoking, 207 Scientific American 3, 4 (July
1962).
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must be compared with those between the same years in 1960,
since today there would be many more in advanced ages, who
should normally have a greater mortality rate than persons of
lesser age), it was found that deaths from lung cancer in the
United States have increased 600 per cent among men and 125
per cent among women." Deaths from lung cancer for the past
several years has ben the principal form of fatal cancer among
men. The figures without adjusting for age differences were, of
course, even more startling: 400 deaths in the United States in
1935; 11,000 deaths in 1945; and 36,000 deaths in 1960, all from
lung cancer.
In the late 1940's a number of investigators became concerned
with this increase in lung cancer and attempted to find out the
cause for it. It was already well known that this disease could
result from prolonged and heavy occupational exposure to indus-
trial dusts and vapors and this was the same type of lung cancer
which was increasing at such an alarming rate-epidermoid
carcinoma and undifferentiated carcinoma (as distinguished from
adenocarcinoma, in which the diseased cells assume an arrange-
ment resembling that of the cells in a gland). 10 The studies
therefore began to relate the cancer to some sort of contamina-
tion, including industrial fumes and smoking of cigarettes, cigars,
and pipes. Their study had come about ninety years after the
first observation of this causal relationship between tobaco and
cancer by M. Bouisson, an obscure French physician, who in
1859 noted that of 68 patients of his with cancer of the buccal
cavity (45 of the lip, 11 of the mouth, 7 of the tongue, and 5 of
the tonsil) 66 smoked pipes, one chewed tobacco and one used
tobacco in some form. He also observed that cancer of the lower
lip ordinarily developed at the point where the pipe was held
in the mouth, and lip cancer occurred more frequently among
individuals who smoked short-stemmed pipes than those who
smoked long-stemmed pipes or used stems which did not conduct
heat. He concluded that cancer resulted from irritation of the
tissue by tobacco and heat."
These investigators in the 1940's also took note of the declara-
8 ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
"1 Id. at S.
[Vol. 53,
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tions of two New Orleans surgeons, Drs. Alton Ochsner and
Michael E. DeBakey, that there was a causal connection between
the phenomena of the increase in lung cancer and a general rise
in cigarette smoking.12 These men had observed that nearly all
their lung cancer patients were cigarette smokers. Raymond
Pearl, John Hopkins medical statistician, in 1938 concurred in
the opinion of the New Orleans surgeons when he reported that
smokers had a far shorter life expectancy than those who did not
use tobacco.13 This was followed by the results of the first experi-
mental evidence for an association between tobacco and cancer
when Dr. A. H. Roffo of Argentina painted the backs of rabbits
with tobacco extracts and produced cancer.14
But like so many others in science, these investigators were
not completely convinced of the causal relationship between
cancer and tobacco, so they compiled their own statistics and in
many cases employed a different "prospective" method of study.
That is, they questioned apparently healthy individuals and
followed them before they became sick rather than making
"retrospective" studies of people selected only because they
already had certain illnesses.u Their findings were very similar-
they definitely found that lung cancer was related to tobacco
smoke inhalation and that there was a definite association be-
tween cigarette smoking and coronary diseases, gastric and
duodenal ulcers, certain diseases of the arteries, pulmonary
diseases, cancer of the bladder, cirrhosis of the liver, and other
types of cancer. 10 One of the more interesting studies was that
made by Dr. Wynder 17 when he found that Seventh-Day Ad-
12 Ochsner & DeBakey, Primary Pulmonary Malignancy, Symposium on
Cancer, 68 Surq. Gynec. Obstet. 435 (1939).
13 Hammond, supra note 7, at 3.
14 Roffo, Cancerizacion Castrica por Inqestion de Alquitran Tabaquico, 18
Bol. Inst. Med. Exp. Estud. Cancer Buenos Aires 39 (1941).1 5 See Hammond, supra note 7, at 5.
10 See Doll & Hill, Lung Cancer and Other Causes of Death in Relation to
Smoking, 2 Brit. Med. J. 1071 (1956); Dora, Tobacco Consumption and Mortality
from Cancer and Other Diseases, 74 Public Health Rep. 581 (1959); Hammond,
supra note 7; Hammond & Hor, Smoking and Death Rates-Report on Forty-Four
Months of Follow-up of 187,783 Men, 166 J.A.M.A. 1159, 1294 (1958). See also
Dunn, Lunden & Breslow, Lung Cancer Mortality Experience of Men in Certain
Occupations in California, 50 Amer. J. Public Health 1475 (1960). One of the
earlier studies on the relationship between smoking and coronary artery disease was
made at the Mayo Clinic in 1940. See English, Wilius & Berkson, Tobacco and
Coronary Disease, 115 J.A.M.A. 1327 (1940).
17 Wynder, Lemon & Bross, Cancer and Coronary Artery Disease Among
Seventh-Day Adventists, 12 Cancer 1016 (1959).
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ventists had a much lesser death rate than the general population
in lung cancer and coronary disease. During the same period
this religious group, which believes in total abstention from
alcohol and tobacco, had about the same mortality rate as that
of the general population in other diseases, including cancer in
areas other than the lungs, mouth, larynx, and esophagus.
These studies and others' 8 invoked the Surgeon General of
the Public Health Service to call together 155 expert consultants,
with a nucleus committee of ten, to meet between November
1962 and December 1963 in order to review and evaluate both
the new and older data and, in addition, if possible, to reach some
definitive conclusions on the relationship between smoking and
health in general. The conclusion of these experts was as follows:
1. Lung Cancer
Cigarette smoking is causally related to lung cancer in men;
the magnitude of the effect of cigarette smoking far outweighs
all other factors. The data for women, though less extensive,
point in the same direction. The risk of developing lung cancer
increases with duration of smoking and the number of cigarettes
smoked per day, and is diminished by discontinued smoking.
The risk of developing lung cancer for the combined group of
pipe smokers and cigar smokers is greater than for non-smokers,
but much less than that for cigarette smokers.
2. Bronchitis and Emphysema
Cigarette smoking is the most important of the causes of
chronic bronchitis in the United States, and increases the risk of
dying from chronic bronchitis and emphysema. A relationship
exists between cigarette smoking and emphysema but it has not
been established that the relationship is causal. Studies demon-
strate that fatalities from this disease are infrequent among non-
smokers.
3. Coronary Artery Disease
Male cigarette smokers have a higher death rate from coro-
nary artery disease than non-smoking males, but it is not clear
that the association has causal significance.
18 For a more complete analysis of all the past studies, see the various tables
in the Surgeon General's Report.
[Vol. 53,
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4. Other Cancer
Pipe smoking appears to be causally related to lip cancer.
Cigarette smoking is a significant factor in the causation of
cancer of the larynx. The evidence supports the belief that an
association exists between tobacco use and cancer of the esoph-
agus, and between cigarette smoking and cancer of the urinary
bladder in men, but the data are not adequate to decide whether
these relationships are causal. Data on an association between
smoking and cancer of the stomach are contradictory and in-
complete.
5. Other Diseases
Epidemiological studies indicate an association between cig-
arette smoking and peptic ulcer which is greater for gastric than
for duodenal ulcer. Tobacco amblyopia (dimness of vision unex-
plained by an organic lesion) has been related to pipe and cigar
smoking by clinical impressions. The association has not been
substantiated by epidemiological or experimental studies. In-
creased mortality of smokers from cirrhosis of the liver has been
shown in the prospective studies. The data are not sufficient to
support a direct or causal association."
The Committee went into further study to link smoking to
other diseases but could conclude nothing from it. Its "judgment
in brief' came out with a resounding conclusion: "Cigarette
smoking is a health hazard of sufficient importance in the United
States to warrant appropriate remedial action."20 It therefore
definitely linked smoking with lung cancer and with other
diseases to a lesser extent.
Of course there will be those who disagree with the decision
of the Committee. Before the report came out there were many
who did not approve of the way the surveys were conducted"1
and others, including the Tobacco Industry Research Committee,
who felt that no conclusions could yet be reached from the
evidence, especially since many smokers go all through life
19 Surgeon General's Report 31-40.
20 Id. at 33.
21 See the testimony given by Drs. Harry S. N. Greene and Ian MacDonald on
July 25, 1957, and by Dr. R. H. Rigdon on July 19, 1957, before the Subcommittee
on Legal and Monetary Affairs, Committee on Government Operations, United
States House of Representatives.
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without incurring lung cancer.22 It remains to be seen, however,
whether these critics will continue their doubt now that the
report has been released to the public by the Surgeon General.
Theories of Action
Once the plaintiff in an action for injuries or wrongful death
leaps over the hurdle of causation, he then encounters the
tremendous problem of what theory of action to proceed under.
As will be seen from a review of the cases in this field, it is a rare
and courageous plaintiff who goes into court with only one theory
of action in his complaint. The "shotgun" approach will probably
continue until there is a much broader base of decisions in this
field so that the plaintiff will know that his cause of action is
the only one of merit that he can pursue.
A. Negligence
1. Proceeding Under Negligence
In Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.,2 3 the defendant
won at the trial level when the court granted the motion to
dismiss the breach of warranty count at the close of plaintiffs
evidence and granted the motion for directed verdict on the
remaining negligence count at the end of all the evidence. The
Third Circuit in remanding held that both theories of action
should have been presented to the jury, and noted that under
Pennsylvania law a supplier of products who knows or should
know that the "forseeable use is dangerous to human life unless
certain precautions are taken" and who realizes or should realize
that the user will not in the exercise of reasonable vigilance
recognize the danger, is under a duty to warn the user of such
consequence and to advise proper precautions. 4 The plaintiff
had offered testimony of physicians that the producer was aware
or should have been aware of the dangers involved. Plaintiff's
cause of action was based on the fact that he had to have a lung
removed in 1958 due to cancer, and he alleged this cancer was
the result of smoking Chesterfield cigarettes between 1921 and
2 2 See, e.g., Russ, Smoking and Its Effects (1959).
23295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961), 50 Calif. L. Rev. 566 (1962), 15 Vand. L.
Rev. 1019 (1962).
24 Id. at 299.
[Vol. 53,
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1953. The expert testimony then related that the cigarette manu-
facturer should have been aware that there were dangerous
properties in the cigarettes and, as a consequence, had a duty to
warn the buyer. The gist of the experts' testimony was that
knowledge of the connection between smoking and epidermoid
cancer was being disseminated many years prior to 1953. One
even stated that literature on the relationship between smoking
and cancer was available fifty years ago.25
The appellate court noted that during the time the plaintiff
was using the cigarettes the defendant conducted only one test
to determine the effects of smoking Chesterfields on the nose,
throat and accessory organs, and that this test was inconclusive.
The court held that this evidence was enough to require that the
jury decide whether it was reasonable for the defendant not to
have conducted different or additional tests to determine the
harmfulness of the product.
This, so far, is one of three cases reported in which the
plaintiff has succeeded in getting a negligence claim against a
tobacco manufacturer sent to the jury. In Green v. American
Tobacco Co. 2 6 the plaintiff proceeded under six theories of
liability, which were reduced to two at the close of plaintiff's
evidence: breach of implied warranty and negligence. The
defendant moved at the close of all the evidence for a directed
verdict. The court reserved its decision on this and submitted
it to the jury, which returned with a general verdict for the
defendant. The jury also answered in special interrogatories that
although the decedent in this wrongful death action had died of
cancer of the lung and that this had been proximately caused
by smoking Lucky Strike cigarettes, the defendant could not have
known, prior to February 1, 1956, that users of its product would
be in danger of contracting lung cancer by the inhalation of the
smoke. Of course, it is not known at this time whether the trial
judge would have rendered a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict had the jury in with a different result, so this case is not
nearly as strong as Pritchard in finding that the cause of action
for negligence should be a jury question in cases of this sort.
251d. at 800.
26804 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962), 61 Mich. L. Rev. 1180 (1963).
1965]
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Another similar case is Lartique v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co.2 7 where the plaintiff sued for the wrongful death of her
husband, basing her claim on breach of warranty and negligence.
In this action two cigarette manufacturers (Liggett and Myers
Tobacco Company and R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company) were
joined as the defendants because the decedent had smoked both
Picayune and Camel cigarettes. The court instructed the jury in
a hybrid instruction concerning both negligence and warranty.8
The result was a general verdict for the defendant, and the case
was affirmed on appeal. Plaintiffs appealed primarily on the
ground that the charge to the jury on implied warranty was so
interspersed with principles of negligence as to be misleading.
Since no material mention of the instruction on negligence was
made on appeal, this case is not very useful in deciding whether
(in cancer cases) the question on negligence is one for the jury.
In Cooper v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.29 the plaintiff began
with a multiplicity of theories but had such a difficult time with
presenting a proper complaint that his original grounds were
reduced to two, negligence and deceit, and those were in turn
reduced to deceit by the time the plaintiff had finished with the
problems inherent in the complaint. The result was a summary
judgment for the defendant, but might have been something
else had the plaintiff's lawyer proceeded under another theory.
In Ross v. Philip Morris Co.30 plaintiff's lawyer made the same
fatal mistake in failing to comply with procedural rules in his
complaint. The original complaint alleged negligence, willful
misrepresentation, breach of warranty, and violation of certain
state statutes, but these were finally reduced to one count by the
time the plaintiff finished amending his complaint. This last
theory was one for breach of warranty, which was not then
actionable in Missouri between those not in privity of contract.
Luckily, however, the plaintiff retained other counsel and got a
third amended complaint grounded not only on warranty but on
negligence and fraud and deceit as well. Thus, when the trial
27317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963), 30 Brook-
lyn L. Rev. 155 (1963).
28 Id. at 23-24.
29256 F.2d 464 (1st Cir. 1958) (per curiam), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 875
(1958).
30164 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Mo. 1958), ay'd, 828 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964).
[Vol. 58,
LEGAL LIABInY IN TOBACCO PRODUCrS CASES
court granted summary judgment on the warranty issue, the
plaintiff still had the other counts left. The final result was
adverse to the plaintiff, but at least the attorney still had been
able to get it to the jury after part of the complaint was lost.
With Pritchard as the leading case declaring that the issue
of negligence involving cancer caused by smoking cigarettes is
one for the jury, the plaintiff has overcome the first hurdle of
being able to present the question to the jury. Of course, that
case was decided under Pennsylvania law in a federal suit based
on diversity jurisdiction. It is speculative whether other courts
will be in accord in deciding that it is a jury question whether the
cigarette manufacturer was acting reasonably in not researching
the product more or in not warning the consumer. At least one
author has agreed that an action for negligence exists, and he
has declared four bases for it: (a) failure by the manufacturer
to keep abreast of scientific knowledge and developments; (b)
failure by the manufacturer to make adequate tests to determine
the composition of its product; (c) failure to warn consumers of
dangers which the manufacturer knew or should have known
about and which are not apparent to a consumer; (d) false
assurances of safety made by a manufacturer without any
reasonable basis for them, whether or not a warning was
required.31
2. Negligence and Privity
The problem of privity, though a very genuine one under
warranty theory, is not too acute in a negligence approach. If
the applicable state substantive law requires privity between
parties, the case will be thrown out of court at the outset.32 But
under the historical MacPherson rule accepted by the great
majority of states, a manufacturer of a product may be liable to
the ultimate user, not in privity of contract, "if the nature of a
thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb
in peril when negligently made.""3 Earlier cases not involving
cancer had also recognized that cigarettes come within this
31 Rossi, The Cigarette-Cancer Problem: Plaintiff's Choice of Theories Ex-
plored, 34 So. Cal. L. Rev. 399 (1961).
3'Cf. Ross v. Philip Morris Co., 164 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Mo. 1958), aff'd,
328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964).3 3 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053
(1916).
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classification and that recovery could be based on negligence
without privity 4 But even further, courts have held that tobacco
products, though not food, can be regarded as so analogous to
food that they are within the "imminently dangerous to health"
category, another exception under the MacPherson rule.35 Of
course, most of these involve patent defects in chewing tobacco,
which is closely akin to food, whereas in the cancer cases the
defect is latent, more debatable and more complex to discover.
It seems, however, that a tobacco consumer should be able to
collect from the manufacturer without privity, since tobacco is
definitely harmful to many users. The court in Pritchard seemed
to be little concerned with privity and this should become the
prevailing rule. However, the plaintiff must always be wary of
this problem in suing a producer.36
3. Contributory Negligence
Contributory negligence and assumption of risk are very likely
problems for the plaintiffs in this field and may be the escape
route for the tobacco manufacturers in cases in which the
plaintiff has started smoking after the SuRGEoN GmmRAi's oEPORT
was released to the public. In all negligence cases generally this
defense of contributory negligence or assumption of risk exists.
As it now stands, however, most companies have been defending
these cases on the ground that in the exercise of reasonable care
they still could not have had any knowledge that lung cancer or
other harmful results could come from prolonged smoking.37
They would be highly inconsistent if they then declared that the
plaintiff clearly knew of the risk and was contributorily negligent
or assumed the risk.
3 4 See Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. DeLape, 109 F.2d 598 (9th Cir.
1940); Meditz v. Ligette & Myers Tobacco Co., 167 Misc. 176, 3 N.Y.S2d 357
(Sup. Ct. 1938).
35 See, e.g., Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Rankin, 246 Ky. 65, 54 S.W.2d
612 (1932) (worm in chewing tobacco); Pillars v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 365 (1918) (human toe in chewing tobacco); Foley v.
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 136 Misc. 468, 241 N.Y. Supp. 233 (Sup. Ct.
1930), aff'd, 232 App. Div. 822, 249 N.Y. Supp. 924 (1931) (mouse fragments in
smoking tobacco); Webb v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 180 S.C. 436, 186
S.E. 383 (1936) (tack in chewing tobacco).
36 For a more complete analysis of this see Dillard & Hart, Product Liability:
Directions for Use and the Duty to Warn, 41 Va. L. Rev. 145, 152 (1955). See
generally Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 43 (1961).
37 See Lartique v. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, cert. denied, 375 U.S.
865 (1963); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962);
Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961).
[Vol. 53,
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If the plaintiff in such a case alleges that the defendant had
a duty to warn him of the possible results of smoking, evidence
of the plaintiff's conduct should be relevant, but not for purposes
of showing contributory negligence. It should only throw light
on the adequacy of the warning. Thus, if the plaintiff, having
been warned, acts in open defiance of the warning, he should be
denied recovery, not on the basis of contributory negligence, but
because the plaintiff has been adequately warned.38 Two leading
authorities in the field have declared that to allow such a defense
of assumption of risk or contributory negligence in a case where
the duty to warn is part of the cause of action is to
indulge in circular reasoning, since usually the plaintiff cannot
be said to have assumed a risk of which he was ignorant or
to have contributed to his own injury when he had no way
of reasonably ascertaining that the danger of injury existed.3 9
One court, however, has declared in dictum that the defense
might lie in a cigarette-cancer case.4
B. Breach of Warranty
1. 'Warranties of Fitness and Merchantability
Although some courts tend to confuse warranty with negli-
gence,4' the liability in warranty does not rest upon a showing
of negligence.4 2 Liability in warranty arises where damage is
caused by the failure of a product to measure up to express or
implied representations on the part of the manufacturer or other
supplier4 3
In this country, the law of warranty is based on either the Uni-
form Sales Act, which is a codification of the common law,44 or on
3s See Vright v. Carter Prods., Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957); Dillard &
Hart, supra note 86, at 163-65.
3 f Dullard & Hart, supra note 86, at 168.
4 See Cooper v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 158 F. Supp. 22, 28 (D. Mass.
1957) (dictum); cf. O'Connell v. Westinghouse S. Ray Co., 288 N.Y. 486, 41
N.E.2d 177 (1942); Alexander v. Wrenn, 158 Va. 486, 164 S.E. 715 (1932).
But see Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 828 F.2d 8 (8th Cir. 1964).
41 See, e.g., Lartique v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied 875 U.S. 865 (1968).421See George v. Willman, 879 P.2d 108 (Alaska 1968); Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).4 3 Frumer & Friedman, Products Liability § 16.01 (1963).44 Ward v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 281 Mass. 90, 92, 120 N.E. 225, 226
(1918).
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the newer law, the Uniform Commercial Code. Under section
15 of the Uniform Sales Act, in every sale:
(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes
known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods
are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on the
seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manu-
facturer or not), there is an implied waranty that the goods
shall be reasonably fit for such purpose.
(2) Where the goods are bought by description from a seller
who deals in goods of that description (whether he be the
grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty
that the goods shall be of merchantable quality.
Although its effect is still uncertain, the Uniform Commercial
Code appears to be about the same with a few changes. Whereas
§ 15(2) above requires a sale by description in order to imply
a warranty of merchantability, U.C.C. § 2-314 does not require
a description in order to raise an implied warranty but only that
the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.
Section 2-314 also spells out the nature of the implied warranty
in relation to the representations on the packaging. Another
relevant change between the two codes is that in § 15(4) of the
Sales Act it is provided that no implied waranty of fitness for a
particular purpose arises in the sale of a "specified article under
its patent or trade name," but in §§ 2-315, 2-316 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, this exception is eliminated and only reliance
on the seller's "skill or judgment" is required.
With these laws in effect, one must then go to the pertinent
cases in the field to see the applicability of them in the field of
injuries sustained through tobacco products. In the original case
of Green v. American Tobacco Co.45 the plaintiff in the wrongful
death action did not pursue the negligence question on appeal
but limited it to the count on breach of implied warranty. Since
the jury came back with a verdict under interrogatories that
declared smoking of the tobacco company's cigarettes to be the
proximate cause of the cancer in the decedents lungs, the
plaintiff felt that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law
under the Florida doctrine of implied warranty. He felt that the
45304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1963), 61 Mich. L. Rev. 1180. This is the original
of the reported cases. The others may have the title interposed, i.e., American
Tobacco Co. v. Green.
[Vol. 53,
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court erred when it charged the jury that the implied warranty
of fitness in Florida depends upon the ability of the manufacutrer
to know about the harmful substances in its product. The jury
had answered another interrogatory concerning the forseeability
of the harmful substance, and declared that the tobacco company
prior to 1956 could not have known that users of Lucky Strike
cigarettes through inhalation of the smoke could contract cancer
of the lung. It was clear, then, that the factual situation boiled
down to whether this doctrine of implied warranty on a product
like cigarettes would apply without any forseeability on the
part of the manufacturer.
The Fifth Circuit in the original appellate action said, how-
ever:
[W] e are convinced that the doctrine of implied warranty by
a manufacturer and seller of the qualities and fitness of the
thing sold for the purpose for which it is intended or desired
is founded on his superior opportunity to gain knowledge
of the product and to form a judgment of its fitness.46
This was seriously questioned in a dissenting opinion by Judge
Cameron 47 who felt that a warranty for wholesomeness cannot be
negated by the manufacturer's saying that reasonable care was
exercised in its efforts to achieve the wholesomeness. The
majority went on to say that there were three classes of products
intended for human consumption in which there is probable
application of the doctrine of implied warranty: (1) those gen-
erally felt to be wholesome, for example, foods; (2) those known
by all to be injurious to some while perhaps beneficial to others,
for example, alcoholic beverages; (3) those heretofore thought
to be wholesome or pleasurable but which constantly expanding
research has now proved or convinced many to be injurious, for
example, cigarettes. The court said that liability would attach
in the first two classes if the product contained some foreign
substance, or was spoiled, or was different in some way from the
product that it was supposed to be. Assuming tobacco products
to be food, or categorized similarly, an example of this would be
the plaintiff who was injured by smoking an exploding cigar.
48
46304 F.2d at 73.
47304 F.2d at 77.
4S Dow Drug Co. v. Nieman, 57 Ohio App. 190, 13 N.E.2d 130 (1936); cf.
Lindner v. Liggett-Myers Tobacco Co., 23 N.Y.S.2d 923 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
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Under the third class, it would be up to the jury to decide whether
the seller had a superior opportunity to gain knowledge of the
product or its source, and, hence, whether the buyer, at the time
of purchase, relied on the judgment of the seller. This analysis
of the court has been criticized by at least one writer, who has
stated that under this doctrine purchasers of thalidomide, for
instance, would have no right to recover against the drug manu-
facturers who had no forseeability of the harmful effects of the
drug.
4 9
But the Fifth Circuit had some reservations on this case, so
it granted the petition for rehearing ° on the basis that since the
case was based on diversity and therefore was founded on Florida
law, it should certify the question of law to the Florida supreme
court.5' This was because the court felt that the question had
not yet been decided by a Florida court. The result was a holding
by the Florida Supreme Court that a cigarette manufacturer is
liable for breach of an implied warranty of merchantibility when
the smoking of its cigarettes was the proximate cause of cancer,
even though the manufacturer could not, by the application of
human skill and foresight, have known that its product was harm-
ful.52 When the Fifth Circuit received this information it reversed
and remanded for a new trial with the answers to the inter-
rogatories intact.53 The primary question at the new trial would
be whether, in spite of the fact that the smoking of defendant's
cigarettes was the proximate cause of decedent's cancer, the
cigarettes were reasonably fit and wholesome. Therefore, it re-
jected the argument of both sides to grant a directed verdict
at the appeal on the grounds that there was no issue left to
decide and remanded for the court to resolve the question of
reasonableness. Judge Cameron, in an opinion concuring in part
and dissenting in part,5 4 again declared that the manufacturer
49 Cigarettes and Vaccine: Unforseeable Risks in Manufacturers Liability
Under Implied Warranty, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 515, 529 (1968).
50 804 F.2d at 85.
51 This was pursuant to statutory authority, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 25.031 (Supp.
1962).
52 Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1963), 52 Geo. L.J.
200 (1963).
53 Green v. American Tobacco Co., 825 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 877 U.S. 948 (1964).
54 825 F.2d at 679.
[Vol. 53,
LEGAL LxBmrry iN TOBACCO PRODUCrS CASES
should be held absolutely liable, since to hold that the standard
of reasonableness should be applied would be to abrogate the
very finding of the jury. To Judge Cameron, when the cigarettes
were the proximate cause of the cancer it was then decided that
they were not reasonably fit and wholesome for use by this
particular consumer. The warranty is made to each buyer, not
to the "normal" buyerY
To some, this decision by the Fifth Circuit is very similar to
saying that the cigarette manufacturers may be liable in negli-
gence.56 But the same court had said that the application of
negligence principles did not belong in implied warranty cases in
Lartique v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 57 The court there applied
the idea of forseeability in implied warranty in approving the trial
court's charge to the jury. Of course, Louisiana law was used,
but that, like Florida's law, is similar to the warranty in the
Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial Code.!8 There-
fore, despite the disclaimor by the court, the result in that case
was the same as if the principle of negligence had been used,
since both hinge on forseeability.
2. Express Warranties
On the question of express warranty, as distinguished from
implied warranty, one case has left its mark. In Pritchard v.
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.'9 the court directed that the issue
of express warranty should have been presented to the jury.
They should have decided whether it was reasonable for the
plaintiff to have relied on the advertisements of the tobacco
company that "a good cigarette can cause no ills" and "nose,
throat and accessory organs not adversely affected by smoking
Chesterfield." Here, too, the court held the question of implied
warranty of merchantability and negligence should have been a
jury issue.
5 See Crotty v. Shartenberg's-New Haven, Inc., 147 Conn. 460, 162 A.2d
513 (1960); Bianchi v. Denholm & McKay Co., 802 Mass. 469, 19 N.E.2d 697
(1939).
za Supra note 49; cf. 1 Frumer & Friedman, op. cit. supra note 43, § 1603[4].
57.317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963). This holding was approved in Ross v. Philip
Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964).
5S 317 F.2d at 27. See Parkinson & Saunders, Implied Warranty in Florida, 12
U. Fla. L. Rev. 241 (1959).
9 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961).
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3. Warranties and Privity
The question of privity in all of these cases may present
many problems. As discussed previously in connection with
negligence theories, numerous fictions have eroded the strict
concepts of privity as applied in warranty theory, especially in
the areas of food and drugs. The Uniform Commercial Code
erodes the concept a little further in § 2-818 entitled "Third
Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Expressed or Implied." The
limited purpose of this section is to give the buyer's family,
household and guests the benefit of the same warranty which
the buyer receives in the contract of scale, thereby freeing such
beneficiaries from any technical far of privity. It should be noted
that while this section expressly extends coverage of warranties,
the comments to the section state that beyond this, the section
is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing
case law on whether the seller's warranties to the buyer who
resells, extend to other persons in the distribution chain. The
Uniform Commercial Code thus seems to turn questions of
privity back to the courts for solution on a case-by-case basis.
Privity was a barrier in Ross v. Philip Morris & Co.60 until
the appellate court straightened out the district court on the law
of privity as applied in Missouri.6' What had actually happened
was that while the appellate court was hearing argument on
Ross the Missouri supreme court struck down the privity require-
ment.62 Because the defendant had prevailed in the lower court
in the cigarette-cancer case, the Eighth Circuit did not feel that
it was necessary to decide the question of privity in the implied
warranty case at hand. However, since it declared that the
question was solved by the state court, it seems clear that privity
had been laid to rest in the court's mind. In Cooper v. R. I.
Reynolds Tobacco Co.63 the absence of privity of contract re-
quired the court to deny recovery under Massachusetts law. But
the other courts have not had trouble with this issue, and it seems
that this question will present less of a problem as time goes by,
inasmuch as the courts are leaning toward fewer restrictions in
recovery against those who produce consumer goods which
60 164 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Mo. 1958).
61 Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964).
62 See Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 872 SW,2d 41 (Mo. 1963).
63 234 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1956).
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prove to be harmful."' The leading case in this field is Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,6 5 which has applied the
MacPherson rule of negligence to the cases involving implied
warranty. In that case the court refused to confine the privity
exception in warranty cases to food and held that in the entire
field of consumer products privity should not be required.
C. Misrepresentation
Another theory of recovery upon which the manufacturer
may be held liable, is that of misrepresentation. 6  However, no
success has come about as yet, so this theory of recovery will
probably not develop so long as the theories of negligence and
warranty offer greater chances of success. In Cooper v. R. I.
Reynolds17 the First Circuit recognized that an action lay for
deceit in this field, but the defendant was granted summary
judgment when it refuted the plaintiffs claim that she relied on
the defendant's advertisements that more doctors smoked Camels
than any other cigarettes. The company showed by affidavits
that no such advertisements were furnished for publication dur-
ing the time alleged by the plaintiff, and summary judgment was
granted when the plaintiff filed no opposing affidavits.
Several other cases present scanty authority on the subject.
In Ross v. Philip Morris & Co.68 the plaintiff abandoned the part
of the complaint alleging fraud and deceit after the district court
granted summary judgment for the tobacco producer on this
issue. There are not enough facts to indicate just what the claim
was based upon, but it is probably safe to assume that it was
similar to that in the Cooper case. In R. I. Reynolds v. Hudson69
the plaintiff brought an action based primarily upon misrepre-
sentation. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that the claim was barred because the action was filed
too late. This was denied by the trial court and upheld by the
Fifth Circuit. The result was an implication that the theory of
misrepresentation was a valid claim and could very well be
64 For a more complete analysis of this problem see Prosser, The Assault Upon
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960). See also
Frumer & Friedman, op. cit. supra note 43, § 16.03; 27 Mo. L. Rev. 194 (1962).
035 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).6 6 See, e.g., Wright v. Carter Prods., Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d. Cir. 1957).
137 256 F.2d 464 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 857 (1958).
6S 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964).
69 314 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1963).
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presented to the jury if the plaintiff could prove his allegations.
Also in the Pritchard case70 there was no claim based on
deceit as such, but the case was based on the theory of express
warranty, which was essentially misrepresentation. The plaintiff
alleged that the tobacco company advertised that Chesterfields
were pure and could cause no ills. The issue was presented to
the jury on the warranty issue, but not on misrepresentation.
Thus, although misrepresentation by itself has not been suf-
ficient to create manufacturer's liability, it must be remembered
that it relates directly to the expressed and implied warranty pro-
visions discussed previously and can be used therefore to supple-
ment those theories.
Conclusion
With the release to the public of the SuRGEoN GENmAL's
REPORT, and with all the experts' opinions, it seems clear that
with the proper expert testimony the plaintiff in a personal injury
suit against a tobacco company for injuries caused by using
tobacco products may very well prevail. The problem of causa-
tion was an extremely tough hurdle a few years ago, but testimony
today is readily available to show causation. Once this problem
is solved, the plaintiff must next make his decision regarding the
theory of action. The successful choice of the proper cause of
action will depend in large part upon state law. For example, if
the state law in such a diversity action (or it might be a case in
a state court) holds that a strict privity requirement will bar a
negligence or warranty suit against the tobacco company, then
the plaintiff's greatest problem will be to get the jurisdiction to
adopt the more liberal and modem view of MacPherson and
Henningsen to allow recovery in consumer products cases. If he
cannot succeed in this his only choice is to use other remedies,
the best of which appears to be that of misrepresentation. That
theory has not yet succeeded, however, so the plaintiff must be
ready with his proof or else suffer a directed verdict or summary
judgment, as the plaintiff did in Cooper.
It must be noted here, though, that the chance of recovery
in these cases has never been better and the chances will improve
as more of these cases are brought before the courts. Causation,
7 0 Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1963).
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a tremendous hurdle at one time, is almost solved now. Getting
the case to the jury was also a difficult problem, especially with
the proper instructions. This has been solved, at least in part,
by the decisions in Green and Pritchard, to allow the questions
of negligence and warranty to be decided by the jury. It may
be that many courts will adopt the rationale of Judge Camerson's
dissent in Green and decide that once the jury has determined
that the illness has been proximately caused by the tobacco
product, warranty has been established without the jury having
to decide whether the tobacco company was acting reasonably.
The best result for all, it sems, is to allow recovery on an
implied warranty, at least where there has been no warning by
the manufacturer. If the cigarette companies will place an
adequate warning on their packages that prolonged use may
result in cancer and other illnesses they could perhaps escape
liability under current theories. Query is whether they would
be willing to chance the risk of decreased sales by having the
warning on the packages. Against that they must weigh the
possibility of liability to the consumer for illnesses contracted.
The result should be that the producers would be liable if they
are not willing to warn the buyer, since they now know from the
SuRGEON GENERAL'S REPORT that highly qualified experts find a
causal connection between use of tobacco and certain illnesses.
19651
